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NOTES
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-JURISDICTION OF STATE OVER EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMES COMMITTED BY ITS CITIZENs-There is a

general proposition of criminal law which has been so frequently

reiterated and so generally accepted without question that it has
become almost axiomatic. It is, that crimes are purely local and
punishable only in the jurisdiction where committed. As a broad
statement of the law, this is true, but there is one important phase
of the situation which seems to have been so engulfed by the very
generality of this proposition, that it has been lost sight of by
members of the bar, and has allowed some of our courts to go astray
in its application, or rather non-application. An excellent example
of this failure to discern one of the basic principles of government
is the late New Jersey case of State v. Stow,' holding that a citizen
of New Jersey who, in Pennsylvania, committed an offense against
the election laws of the former state, nevertheless cannot be punished
in New Jersey because the crime was not there committed.
The contention upon which the criticism of this case is rested
is, that a state has control not only over all property and persons
State v. Stow, 84 At. Rep. 1063 (N. J., 1912).
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within its territory, but also over the person of its own citizens,
no matter where they be. This is one of the fundamental incidents
of sovereignty which cannot be doubted. 2 But its corollary, which
should be equally as clear, has failed of recognition in many courts.
This is, that a state may take jurisdIction of and punish, fora crime
committed outside its territory, one of its own citizens, where the
crime was against h:s own laws.3 This rule is not recognized at
common law, 4 although it does seem that the ancient Court of the
Constable and Marshal exercised just such power.$ But this jurisdiction may be conferred by statute, provided the constitution of
the state does not prohibit. There does not seem to be any valid
objection other than that of constitutionality which could be raised
to such legislation. Public policy cannot stand in the way because, after all, that is the creation and creature of the legislature.
The argument could be made that a state might even go so far as
to punish acts committed against it in another state by persons
not its own citizens. In fact, a Texas statute which did just that
thing was held valid.$ But the early North Carolina case of State
v. KnightP points out the theory of government opposed to any such
legislation. The court says: "The right of punishing, being
founded upon the consent of the citizens, express or implied, cannot
be directed against those who never were citizens, and who likewise committed the offense beyond the territorial limits of the
state claiming jurisdiction."
England's statutes give jurisdiction for offenses committed
outside its boundaries by its citizens in the case of treason, s murder or manslaughter,9 bigamy,10 and offenses against such special
acts as the Foreign Marriage Act," the Foreign Enlistment Act,"!
the Official Secrets Act 1" and the Explosive Substances Act,14 etc.
There are many such statutes, both federal and state, in the United
States.16
1
Story on Conflict of Laws, Sect. 22.
3 Commonwealth v. Kunzmann, 41 Pa. 429 (1862).
4Lord Brougham in Warrender v. Warrender, 9 Bligh 89 (Eng., 1834) at
P. i19 says: "The lex loci must needs govern all criminal jurisdiction, from the
nature of the thing and the purpose of that jurisdiction."
5 Coke, 3 Inst. 48: "If two of the king's subjects go over into a foreign
realm and fight there, and the one kill the other, this murder being done out of
the realm, cannot be for want of trial heard and determined by the common

law, but it may be heard and determined before the constable and marshal."
6 Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. App. 289 (1882). This statute subjected to
punishment any person who, within or without the Atate, forged any instrument
affecting the title of land in Texas.
7 State v. Knight, i Taylor's North Carolina Rep. 65 (x799).
" Statute 35 Hen VIII, c. 2, s. I (1543).
9 24 and 25 Vict., c. 1oo, s. 9 (i861).
1024 and 2,5 Vict., C. 100, s. 57 (1861).
" 55 and 56 Vict., c. 23, s. 15 (1892).
" 33 and 34 Vict., c. ig, ss. 16, 17 (1870).
" 52
14 46

and 53 Vict., c.

10,

s. 9 (1889).

and 47 Vict., c. 3, s. 7 (1883).
1[See Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. App. 289 (1882); State v. Haskell, 33 Maine

127 (1851);
2 Va. Cas.

[1901],

People v. Botkin,

132

Cal.

231 (190!);

Commonwealth v. Gaines,
121; 3 U. S. Comp. Stat.

172 (18i9); 1 Bishop New Cr. Law, Sect.

Sect. 5335.
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There is some strong dissent in the United States to the proposition here contended for. The leading case for the stand against
punishing extra-territorial crimes is People v. Merrill6' in New York.
In that case, a state statute provided for the punishment of anyone who should sell a negro that had been kidnapped from the
state. The court refused to give it force as applied to a sale outside the state. Other cases oppose the doctrine just as strongly,17
so that there is no uniformity on the question in the states, however clear it should be from the point of view of logic and the
theory of government. But on just one point, practically every
sovereignty agrees. That is, that it has the power to punish for
.all crimes done on a ship under its flag, whether in its own waters,
on the high seas, or in foreign ports,18 even though the foreign state
may also have jurisdiction over the crime.9

J.F.N.
EVIDENCE-PROOF OF ONE SEXUAL CRIME AT A TRIAL FOR

ANOTHER-In People v. Gibson,' a prosecution for statutory rape,
evidence that the accused had sexual intercourse with a playmate
of prosecutrix in the same room a few minutes after the act charged
was not admitted, on the ground that the two acts were not so
connected as to be part of the same transaction.
"The general rule is that on a prosecution for a particular
crime evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that
the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of
that for which he is on trial, even though it be a crime of the same
sort, is irrelevant and inadmissible."2 That is a principle to which
no court will dissent, but it is upon the application of the exceptions to the general rule that the courts differ. The following exceptions may be regarded as the most important, being those which
are included in the classification given by most authorities3 Evidence of other offenses is admissible if such offenses are relevant
(I) as part of the res gestae, or to prove or show (2) identity of person
or crime, (3)knowledge, (4) intent, (5)motive, (6) system or scheme,
(7) malice. There must be some logical and natural connection
between the extraneous crime offered in evidence and the crime
charged, and whether the connection necessary to render it relevant
and admissible exists is a question for the trial judge to determine.
If the evidence be so dubious that the judge does not clearly per16People v. Merrill, 2 Parker's N. Y. Cr. Rep. 590 (1855).
17 U. S. v. Smiley, 6 Sawyer 640 (U. S. C. C., 1864); Johnson

v. Common-

wealth, 86 Ky. 122 (z887); Cruthers v. State, 16i Ind. z39 (1903); State v. Cutshall, xio N. C. 538 (1892).
18Reg. v. Armstrong, 13 Cox C. C. 184 (Eng., x875); Reg. v. Anderson,
ri Cox C. C. x98 (Eng., 1868).
'" Wildenhus's Case, 120 U. S. 1 (886).
199 N. E. Rep. 599 (Ill., 1912).
2 12 Cyc. 405.

3Wigmore, Evidence, Sects. 300, 3o6; Wharton, Criminal Evidence (toth
Ed., 1912) Sect. 31; People v. Molineaux, 168 N. Y. 264, 293 (1901).
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ceive the connection, the benefit of the doubt should be given to
the accused and the evidence rejected.' Such is the test and it is
obvious that evidence will often be deemed relevant by one judge
and not by another. The discussion in this note will be confined
principally to the admisibility of other offenses in prosecutions
for rape and other sexual crimes.
A consideration of the cases of prosecution for rape whe.e a
different kind of crime was offered shows that such evidence is admissible (i) if it is a part of the res gestae, i. e., if a narration of the
crime charged necessarily involves a description of the other offense,
or, to use a phrase much preferred by Professor Vigmore, 6 if the
two crimes are "inseparably connected." Thus, in a charge of
rape, evidence that the accused struck a relative of the prosecutrix
to prevent an interference with commission of crime charged was
admitted. 6 In a charge of rape, evidence that the accused searched
and robbed the escort of prosecutrix immediately before commission of the crime charged was admitted. 7 (2) To prove identity of
accused. a (3) Proof of a specific intent in a sexual crime is essential only in a charge of assault with intent to rape.
In prosecutions for rape, evidence of prior similar offenses
committed by the accused upon females other than the prosecutrix
is admissible where both offenses were committed upon the same
occasion, i. e., part of the res gestae.9 Under this rule, the evidence
4Underhill, Criminal Evidence (2nd Ed., i9IO),
72 Pa. 6o (1872), a leading case.

160;

Shaffner v. Com..

6 Sect. 218.

6

Thompson v. State, 11 Texas App. 51 (188x); Oakley v. State, 135 Ala.

15 (1902).
' State v. Taylor, 118 Mo. I53 (1893).
There are many cases where, on a
charge for murder of one person, evidence that accused also killed other persons
is admissible on the ground that the several crimes were inseparably connected.
Hickman v. People, 137 IIl. 75 (189i); State v. Perry, 136 Mo. 126 (1896); State
v. Porter, 32 Ore. 135 (i89i); State v. Hayes, 14 Utah 118 (1896); a leading
case in which the facts did not come within the rule is People v. Molineux, x68
N. Y. 264 (I901).
8 Vickers v. U. S., i Okla. Crim. 452, 461 (i9o8). In a trial for rape, evidence
that accused had burglariously taken a weapon belonging to tha witness just
prior to crime charged was admitted to show the accused's identity. Dabney v.
State, 82 Miss. 252 (1903). In a trial for rape, evidence of larceny in an adjoining
room during the same night was excluded on the ground that the evidence was
unnecessary to prove identity. The latter case appears to be the sounder law.
9 As a matter of fact the principal case seems to conflict with a case in the
same jurisdiction, People v. Abrams, 249 II1. 619 (1911). In a prosecution for
crime against nature, evidence of a similar act upon another child at the same
time was admitted. The court said, p. 623, "but when the whole testimony
is considered these contradictions [as to which of the children had been mistreated first] become unimportant. Both girls testified positively that the
offense was committed upon each of them."
In Harmon v. Territory, is

Okla. 147, 159 (1905), upon a charge of common law rape, evidence that a sister

of prosecutrix was contemporaneously raped in the same house by other men
was admitted because it was relevant especially to show lack of consent and the
use of force; the court took occasion to say (p. x62): "We conclude that the two
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offered in the principal case should have been admitted and it is
submitted that although the other offense was subsequent to the
crime charged, yet it was so proximate in point of time as to give
color to and corroborate that crime.
In a charge of assault with intent to commit rape the admission of evidence of similar offenses upon other females for purpose
of proving the specific intent can hardly be said to be any wider.
Wigmorelo says: "Accordingly, where the charge is assault with
intent, former acts of the sort should be received without any
limitation except as to time; though the courts can hardly be said
to have accepted this result fully.""

In prosecutions for sexual offenses, the weight of authority
is decidedly in favor of the admission of similar offenses between
the same parties which were prior to the crime charged.12 The
reasons given-are various, e. g., as corroborative evidence; as tending to characterize or explain the crime charged; to show the true
relation existing between the parties; and to show a specific intent where that is necessary. As to the admissibility of subsequent offenses between the same parties the authorities are in conflict, the weight of authority and better reasoning seeming to reject
crimes .

.

.

. are so interwoven in their details and circumstances that the

proof of one is corroborative evidence of the other." In Proper v. State, 85"
Wis. 615, 628 (1893), in a charge of rape, evidence that the accused had sexual
intercourse with another girl in the same room upon the same occasion was admitted as corroborative evidence.
In the following cases the evidence was rejected as irrelevant: Janzen v.
People, 159 Ill. 440 (1896); State v. LaMont, 23 S. D. 174 (909);
v. State, 75 Neb. 27 (1905).
10 Evidence, Vol. I, p. 432.

Nickolizack

11Such evidence was admitted in State v. Desmond, 1o9 Iowa 72 (1899);
State v. Sheets, 127 Iowa 73 (1905); in the latter case it does not appear whether
the other offenses were prior or subsequent to the crime charged; at any rate,
all occurred upon the same occasion.
The evidence was rejected in State v. Walters, 45 Iowa 389 (1877); State
v. Marselle, 43 W\ash. 273 (I9o6); Vebb v. State, 7 Ga. App. 35 (910); McAllister v. State, 112 Wis. 496 (i9ox); in the latter case the prior assault was
committed only one hour before the assault charged; case is regarded as unsound by Wigmore.
n Wharton, p. 170; Lawson v. State, 2o Ala. 65 (1852); People v. Boers,
13 Cal. App. 686 (i91o); Bigcraft v. People, 30 Colo. 298 (i902); Brevaldo v.

State, 21 Fla. 789 (x886); Bass v. State, io3 Ga. 227 (1897); State v. Walters,
45 Iowa 389 (1877); People v. Gray, 251 Ill. 431 (1911); State v. Snover, 64 N.
J. L. 65 (1899); People v. O'Sullivan, 104 N. Y. 481 (1887); State v. Guest
Ioo N. C. 410 (1888); Com. v. Bell, x66 Pa. 405 (895); in State v. Sykes, 191
Mo. 62, 8o (i9o5), evidence that accused aided and abetted the commission of
rape by another male upon the prosecutrix was admitted as part of the res gesiae; in U. S. v. Griegs, i i N. M. 392 (1902), evidence of an adulterous act committed four years previously was admitted.
Contra, Rex v. Floyd, 7 Car. and P. 318 (1833); State v. Riggio, 124 La.
614 (19o9); State v. Dlugozima, 7 Dela. 151 (i9o9); State v. Bates, to Conn.

372 (1834); Barnett v. State, 44 Tex. Cr. 592 (19o3), overruling Hamilton v.
State, 36 Tex. Cr. 372 (1896).
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such evidence.", In one of the cases,14 it was said: "Proof of
previous acts of sexual intercourse would tend to show a much
greater probability of the commission of a similar act charged to>
have occurred subsequent thereto, but the converse of this proposition would not be true, as the proof of a-crime committed by
parties on a certain day could have no tendency to prove that they

had, previous thereto, committed a similar offense."
L B.
MORTGAGES-MERGER-SUBROGATIO-In a recent English
case of involved facts the time-honored rule of merger was applied
in spite of the fact that the case arose in chancery, where the oft
expressed doctrine that equity looks with disfavor on merger onginated.' As is too often the case, if one is to believe the decision.
the outcome was due to the "stupid ingenuity" of the unsuccessful
litigant's solicitor. In order to transfer a mortgage and the equity
of redemption at the same time to separate parties, the defendants
in this action, the mortgagee deeded back the premises to the mortgagor, which is necessary under the English theory of the mortgage.
The mortgagor then conveyed by warranty deed to one of the defendants, who in turn executed a mortgage to the other defendant
for the same amount as the replaced encumbrance. The three
deeds were executed within the space of forty-eight hours. There
was a second mortgage unknown to all the parties but the original
mortgagor. It was held that the second mortgagee was entitled
to priority. At first blush this would seem a clear case of extinguishment. The debtor has paid his debt, the mortgage is cancelled and the second lien arises to a new dignity. That a mortgagor cannot set up one mortgage which he has discharged against
a later one of his own making is legal gospel.? A reason frequently
13 Pope v. State, 137 Ala. 56 (i9o3); State v. Markins, 95 Ind. 464 (1884);
People v. Fowler, 104 Mich. 449 (1895); St. v. Palmberg, I99 Mo. 233 (i9o6);
People v. Robertson, 88 N. Y. App. Div. 198 (i9o3); Smith v. State, 44 Tex.
Cr. 137 (1902).

Admitted in Crane v. People, 168 Ill. 397 (1897); Com. v. Nichols, 1i4.
Mass. 285 (1873); State v. Witham, 72 Maine 531 (1881); State v. Robertson,
121 N. C. 551 (1897); State v. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 (1876).
14 People v. Clark, 33 Mich. 112, 115 (1876).
1 Manks v. Whitely, 81 L. J. Ch. D. 457 (1912), reversing the decision of
Parker, J., 80 L. J. Ch., 696 [i9i I], Fletcher-Moulton, L. J., dissenting.
I Otter v. Vaux, 6 De G. M. and G. 638 (Eng., i858); Lewin on Trusts, Vol.
2 (8ch Ed.), § 728; Pomeroy, Eq. Juris., Vol. 2, § 797. Purchase of mortgage
by trustee in bankruptcy of mortgagor does not existinguish it, Brown v. Lap.
ham, 3 Cush. 551 (Mass., 1849). The mortgagor's payment of the mortgage
does not extinguish it as to a purchase, from him, of the equity of redemption,
Stillman v. Stillman, 2z N. J. Eq. 126 (I7o); Stanhope's Estate, 184 Pa. 414.
(1898).
If a purchaser of the equity of redemption personally assumes the mortgage, an assignment of it to him operates as an extinguishment, Burke v. Abbot,
io9 Ired. i (S. C., 1885); McCabe v. Swap, 14 Allen x88 (Mass., 1867); Jones,
Mortgages, § 864. Contra, Young v. Morgan, 89 I11.199 (1878). On the
other hand, subrogation was allowed when the premises were sold subject to
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given for this rule is that the second mortgagee contracts for that
privilege which belongs to every encumbrancer whether he acquires his lien by contract or by judgment or statute. The rule
is nothing more than an application of the legal as well as moral
commandment that one must pay his debts.
There are reasons, however, which certainly would seem to
justify a suspension of the rule in this case. The mortgagor did
not in reality pay his debt. He was unable to pay it and induced
the defendants to take the property. Before the three deeds were
executed the defendants paid the first mortgagee the amount of his
claim, the defendant mortgagee providing the amount of the principal sum. Subsequently the defendant mortgagor paid the balance
of the purchase price. This appears to be nothing more than a
purchase of the mortgage and of the equity of redemption separately,
In fact the court seems to have treated it as such and a majority
concluded that even then the second mortgagee was entitled to
priority. The decision was based on the theory of merger which
is, in brief, that where two interests unite in the same the lesser
sinks into the greater. But against this rule of law equity will give
relief where there is an intention on the part of the person holding
the two interests to keep them separate. This intention may be
manifested by his acts and conduct or, in the absence of express
intention, it will be presumed from the position of the dual owner.
If it would be against his interest to permit a merger then the presumption is that he intended to keep the two separate.3 In the
absence of any intention the courts will apply the rule of law, and,
in the case under discussion, it was said that inasmuch as there was
no intention expressed, nor could one be presumed, merger must
follow. The reason given for refusing to presume an intention
to keep separate was that although it was manifestly to the defendants' interest to keep the two estates apart, nevertheless since
they were ignorant of the fact there must hive been an intent to
merge and that this intent once formed cannot be changed. Certainly this is good logic, but hardly called for under the circumstances and in view of the evident preponderance of equity in
favor of the defendants. In at least one American jurisdiction,
the court considers this presumption of intention a rule of law and
holds that there will never be a merger where it is contrary to the
owner's interest, whether he knew of that interest or not.4 On
the other hand it has been held that so long as third parties who
acquire their rights subsequently to the union of the two estates are
not affected, the time for the presumption of an intention is exthe mortgages and the purchaser paid the mortgage debt. Barnes v. Mott,
64 N. Y. 397 (1876); Capitol Nat'l. Bank v. Holmes, 43 Col. 154 (t9o8); Ryer
v. Gass, 130 Mass. 227 (1888). So where one of two joint mortgagors pays the
debt, the mortgage is not extinguished. Duncan v. Drury, 9 Pa. 332 (1848);
Saint3 v. Cornwall, 207 Pa. 270 (19o3).

Forbes v. Moffatt, x8 Ves. Jr. 384, (i8ii); James v. Morey,
.(N. Y., ,823).
4 Stanton v. Thompson, 49 N. H. 272 (1870).

2

Cow. 246
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tended, just as it is in the case of an actual intention expressed.'
The decision of the principal case was based on Toulmin v. Steere,d
a case which has been criticized by text writers and confined by
the cases to its peculiar facts.?
The counsel and court did not discuss the question whether
or not the first mortgage could not be revived by means of the
equity of subrogation. This would hinge primarily on the interpretation of the transactions of the parties. If the payment to the
first mortgagee should be considered as made by the mortgagor
with money loaned him by the defendants then the latter would not
be entitled to substitution unless they had expressly contracted
for that right. It would not be sufficient to presume such a"conventional" subrogation if they accepted another mortgage believing that it was the only lien. 8 Subrogation is based on the
theory that there has been an equitable assignment arising from an
express contract of the parties or from the fact that the present
claimant had some interest in the property which he attempted
to protect by discharging the first lien., But the mere fact that
one's loan has been used to pay off a mortgage does not entitle one
to subrogation.
Assuming however that the payment to the first mortgagee
was made directly by the defendants, so as to create in them an
equitable right in the mortgage, would the subsequent reconveyance by the first mortgagee, their trustee, with their consent, work
an extinguishment, so as to give the plaintiff priority? There are
several American cases which reach a negative conclusion.1O They
state the law to be that where the mortgagee has accepted a new
mortgage and surrendered his prior security or has satisfied it of
record he will be entitled to a revival of his lien if there was another
encumbrance of which he had no actual notice at the time, although
the latter was on record; and in so holding they have devised a
Howard v. Clark, 71 Vermont 424 ([899); Brooks v. Rice, 56 Cal. 428
(i88o). And the fact that the second mortgage was on -record makes no difference. Shaffer v. McCloskey, joI Cal. 576 (1894).
63 Merivale 210 (1817). There was constructive notice in this case, not
by record, but through actual knowledge on part of purcih'ser's solicitor. Mocatto v. Murgatryod, i P. Wins. 393 (1717); Greshold v. Graham, 2 Ch. Cases
170 (1685). And in the latter case it was held that as to liens of which the
purchaser had no notice, he was entitled to priority.
7 Pomeroy, Vol. 2, § 791, note; Lewin, *729, *729, notes; Stevens v. MidHants Ry. Co., L. R. 8 Ch. App. 1o64 (1873); Thorn v. Conn., 64 L. J. Ch. i
(1895); Adams v. Angell, 46 L. J. Ch. 352 (1877); Liquidation, etc. Co. v. Willoughby, 67 L. J. Ch.

252

([898).

3 Nelson v. McKee, 99 N. E. Rep. 447 (Ind., [912); Frederick v. Gehrling,
137 N. W. Rep. 998 (Neb., 1912); Suley v. Bacon, 34 AtI. Rep. 139 (N. J. Ch..
1896); Sash, etc. Co. v. Case, 42 Neb. 281 ([894).
'3 Pore., § 1212.
I0Jones, § 971, Sheldon Subrogation, § ig and cases cited there; Bruse v.
Nelson, 35 Ia. 157 (1872); Campbell v. Trotter, 100 111.281 (1881); but whenthe
mortgagee has actual notice of the other lien and cancels his old mortgage
accepting a new one he loses his priority, Attkinson v. Plumb, 5o IV. Va. 04,
0go).

NOTES
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new ground for subrogation, i. e., mistake. They presume that
the mortgagee would not have so acted had he known the whole
truth. That the same is the rule in England would appear from
a case which held that a mortgagee did not lose his priority by
reconveying and accepting other security which was a charge on
the land." That case was not called to the attention of the court
in the principal case.
J.S.B.
PROPERTY-FIXTURES-As

BETWEEN

TENANT

AND

MORT-

Equitable Guarantee & Trust Company v. Hukill,' an
injunction was asked by a mortgagee of land to restrain the removal
of buildings erected by a tenant of the mortgagor. The tenant
occupied the premises under a lease which expressly gave him
authority to erect frame structures for the storage of lumber in
the course of his business and to remove them during the term.
The tenant being about to remove the buildings so erected, this
suit was brought before the expiration of his term, and before a
foreclosure of the mortgage. In dismissing the bill, the court held
that under these circumstances, as it was not shown that the original security would be impaired, the tenant might remove the
buildings as against the prior mortgagee of his landlord.
In spite of the old maxim, quicquid planatur solo, solo cedit,
the exceptional right of the tenant to remove fixtures annexed for
the purposes of trade has long been recognized,: and it may be
stated generally that the tenant is permitted to remove chattels
annexed to the realty of his landlord, which were so placed for purposes of trade, provided that such annexed articles are removable
without material injury to the freehold.* As between mortgagor
and mortgagee, however, the old, stricter rule has been applied,
and a mortgagor may not remove fixtures which he has attached
to the freehold subsequent to the mortgage, as against his mortgagee.
That such fixtures have been attached for trade purposes seems to
be immaterial.'
GAGEE-In

21 Stevens v. Mid-Hants Ry. Co., L. R. 8 Ch. App. 1o64 (1874).
1 85 Atl. Rep. 60 (Del., 1912).
2 See Henry's case, Y. B. 20 Hen. VII, 13, pl. 24 (15o5); Poole's Case, Salk.

368 (1703).
3 Elwes v. Maw. Salk. 368 (1703); Whitehead v. Bennett, 27 L. J. Ch. 474
(x858); Doty v. Gorham, 5 Pick. 487 (Mass., 1827); Van Ness v. Packard, 2
Pet. 137 (1829); Holbrook v. Chamberlin, ii6 Mass. 155 (874); see also Collamore v. Gillis, 149 Mass. 578 (x889); Wiggins Perry Company v. 0. and M.
Railway, 142 U. S. 396 (1891); Ewell on Fixtures, Second Edition, pp. 121,
126; Amos & Ferrard on Fixtures, Third Edition, pp. 40 el seq.; 2 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, p. 1570; Bronson on Fixtures, Sect. 3o.
4Walmsley v. Milne, 7 C. B. N. . I5 (1859); Longbottom v. Berry, L. R.
5 Q. B. 123 (1869); Climie v. Wood, L. R. 4 Exch. 328 (1869); Holland v. Hod
son, L. R. 7 C. P. 328 (1872); Day v. Perkins, 2 Sandf. Ch. 359 (N. Y., 1845);
Butler v. Page, 7 Met. 40 (Mass., 1843); Jones on Mortgages, Vol. I, Sect. 4;
Bronson on Fixtures, Sect. 62; Amos and Ferrard on Fixtures, Third Edition,
p. 293; Tyler on Fixtures, pp. 561, el seq.
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Where the question arises between a mortgagee and a tenant
of the mortgagor, there is an irreconcilable conflict of decision as
to the tenant's right of removal. Some courts hold that the mortgagor cannot grant to another a greater right than he himself has,
and as he cannot, as against the mortgagee, remove fixtures attached to the land even for trade purposes, he cannot, as against

the mortgagee, grant such right to his lessee, and the lessee can be
restrained from removing chattels after annexation thereof, even
though the original value of the mortgage security be not impaired.$
Other courts have adopted the rule that if the original value of the

security for the payment of the mortgage debt is not affected by
the removal of the fixture, then the morgtagee has no just ground

of complaint against the removal.'

In Merchants' National Bank v. Stanton,7 Mitchell, J., explains this conflict of decision as follows: "It undoubtedly was
formerly the rule that all fixtures annexed subsequent to the execution of the mortgage, whether annexed by the mortgagor or by his
tenant or licensee under a lease or license subsequent to the mort-

gage, became as to the mortgagee, a part of the realty.

But this

rule was founded upon the old common-law doctrine that a mortgage was a conveyance under which the mortgagee became the
legal owner, and was entitled to immediate possession, the mortgagor in possession being considered strictly his tenant at will. . .
But in those states where a mortgage is, as with us, a mere security,
there is a general tendency to repudiate the old rule as inapplicable,
and to hold that, as to fixtures placed on the mortgaged premises

subsequently to the execution of the mortgage, there is no absolute
presumption that they were annexed for the benefit of the realty,
r Ewell on Fixtures, Second Edition, p. 412; Brown, Fixtures, 4th Edition,
p. 6o; Clary v. Owen, 15 Gray 522 (Mass., i86o); Lynde v. Rowe, 12 Allen xao
(Mass., i866).
A similar rule. has been applied in Massachusetts and some other jurisdictions as between a prior mortgagee and a third person annexing chattels to the
premises, as a conditional vendor, licensee, etc.; it would appear to be immaterial whether the right to remove the fixture is asserted before or after foreclosure of the mortgage. See Meagher v. Hayes, 152 Mass. 228 (x89o); Tarbell
v. Page, 155 Mass. 257 (1892); Wight v. Gray, 73 Maine 297 (1882); Young v.
Chandler, 102 Me. 251 (19o6).
4 Bronson, Fixtures, Sect. 70c; Belvin v. Ralcigh Paper Company, 123 N.
C. 139 (1898); Broaddus v. Smith, 121 Ala. 335 (1898); Ellis v. Glover and
Hobson, i K. B. 388 (19o8). The right of removal in the tenant was sustained
even after foreclosure of the mortgage in Pioneer Savings & Loan Co. v. Fuller,
57 Minn. 6o (1894), and Ferris v. Quimby, 41 Mich. 202 (1879), also in Sprague
National Bank v. Erie Railroad Co., 48 N. Y. S. 65 (1897), and Bernheimer v.
Adams, 75 N. Y. S. 93 (1902); but-cf. McFadden v. Allen, 134 N. Y. 489 (1892).
McFadden v. Allen, though decided by the Court of Appeals of New York,
while the later cases in New York are merely Supreme Court decisions, was not
a case involving trade fixtures and seems not inconsistent with the later decisions.
The right of a third party to remove as against a prior mortgagee is sustained in Campbell v. Roddy, 44 N. J. Eq. 244 (x888); Binkley v. Forkner, et
al., 117 Ind. 176 (r888); Paine v. McDowell and Tucker, 71 Vt. 29 (1898); Oil
City Boiler Works v. the Light Company, 81 N. J. L. 491 (i911).
7 55 Minn. 21t, at p. 220 (1893).
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and that, where the intention or agreement of the mortgagor and
the party making the annexation was that the thing annexed should
not become part of the realty, the absence of a concurrent agreement to that effect on the part of a prior mortgagee will not of itself make the annexation a part of the mortgage security. This
would seem just, for, the annexation not having been made when
he took his mortgage, he has not been misled, or advanced anything on the faith of it, and hence ought not to be permitted to avail
himself of it as a part of his security, contrary to the intention of
the party making the annexation."
In Broaddus v. Smith,3 where, as in the principal case, there was
an express agreement between mortgagor and tenant that the latter
might remove certain fixtures, the court held that "Where the
owner of real estate contracts or agrees with a tenant that the tenant
may erect or affix anything on the realty, and that the thing so
affixed shall remain the property of the tenant, a prior mortgagee
of the real estate acquires no interest in the chattel attached, subject, however, to the limitations that the mortgagor and tenant
may not, by their acts, do anything to impair the mortgagee's
security."
The particular question involved in our principal case seems
not to have arisen before in Delaware. The court distinguishes
Watertown Company v. Davis., In that case, there had been a
conditional sale of an engine and boiler to a mortgagor, who made
default in payment of the purchase price. The question arose
between the purchaser of the premises upon foreclosure and the conditional vendor. It appeared that the equipment had been attached to the soil as a permanent improvement to the property.
These circumstances would seem sufficient to warrant the court's
concluding in that case that the rights of the mortgagee rose higher
than those of the conditional vendor.
On the whole, it would seem that where there is evident a
legal intention of both lessor and lessee not to make trade fixtures,
or improvements, a part of the land, and as between these persons,
the buildings remained chattels, removable during the term. the
mortgagee has no equitable ground of complaint when it is not
alleged or shown, that the value of the security which he had when
the mortgage was made, and on which he relied, is impaired by the
annexation and removal of buildings by the tenant during the term
and prior to a foreclosure of the mortgage. It may be said there
fore that the court, approaching a question new in the jurisdiction,
upon which there is considerable conflict of authority, very properly
followed the modern tendency in favor of the lessee's right to remove trade fixtures as against the prior mortgagee of the premises.
H.A.L.
Ala. 335 (1898).
'5 Houst. 192 (Del., 1877).
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PRACTICE-WVILLS-CONCLUSIVENESS OF FOREIGN PROBATE-

A statute in WVest Virginia' provides that the ancillary probate of
foreign wills of personalty or realty (if it is shown in the latter case
that the will conformed in execution, etc., to the lex rei sitae) may
be attacked within five years upon the following grounds: (I)
that the authenticated copy was not a true copy of the will; (2)
that the probate of such will has been set aside by the court admitting it to probate; (3)that such probate was inproperly made.
In a recent case2 the Supreme Court of Vest Virginia held that a
state court of equity had no general jurisdiction, nor jurisdiction
given by the above statute, to set aside a will of realty or personalty on the ground of fraud in the procurement thereof, such will
having been duly probated in the state of the testator's domicile,
and subsequently duly admitted to probate in West Virginia on
the filing of-a duly certified copy.
Even in the absence of such a statute it seems to be settled that
as regards personalty a probate in the jurisdiction of the testator's
domicile is conclusive in the jurisdiction where the property is
situated.2 In such cases, the courts seem to have considered as
decisive the general principle that the succession to personalty is
governed by the lex domicilii.
As regards realty, however, there, is very considerable confusion in the decisions.' The conclusiveness of a foreign probate
is a question of practice and not of substantive law, and a failure
to observe this distinction renders it impossible, in most of the
cases on the subject, accurately to define the limits of the decisions.
The well established rule that real property is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of its locus requires that a will,
to be an effectual disposition of such property, must conform in all
substantive respects to the law of such locus; 5 therefore, although a
court might consider a foreign probate conclusive as to matters
which it properly determines, yet it need give such probate no
effect as regards real property unless it be shown that the will was
executed as required by the lex rei sitae. In Sneed v. Ewing6 the
Supreme Court of Kentucky seems to have observed this distinction: "There is an essential difference between the probate and
the effect of a will. And the probate in Indiana, being in the nature
of a judgment in rem, can not operate conclusively on land which
is in Kentucky. It cannot conclude more than the jurisdiction
in rem gave the court power to decide. The consequence is, that
if the probate had been conclusive as to property in Indiana, it
could not conciude the rights of the parties as to the land in Kent Code of 19o6, Chap. 77, Sect. 25.
2 Woofter, et al. v. Matz, ef aL, 76 S..E. Rep. x31 (V Va., 1912).
3 Goodman v. Winter, 64 Ala. 410 (1881); Willett's App., 50 Conn. 330 (1883);
Knight v Wheeldon, 104 Ga. 3o9 (x899); Nelson v. Potter, 5o N. J. L. 324 (1889).
4The cases on this point are collected in a note to State ex rel. Ruef v.
Distrcit Court, 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 617 (i9o6).
6White v. Howard, 46 N. Y. x44 (1871); Brock v. Frank, 51 Ala. 85 (1874).
'5 J. J. Marsh. 460 (Ky., 183).
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tucky. As to that land, the will was liable to be contested whenever offered as evidence of title, unless it had been recorded in
Kentucky according to her laws; and whenev.er so recorded, the
right to contest it in chancery resulted ipso facto."
Although in this case the will was held invalid as to lands in
Kentucky on a question of substantive law, yet the court intimates
that the probate would not be conclusive even as to the question
of practice it decides. The cases, as stated above, are unsatisfactory on this exact point, but their general trend, as it may be gathered, seems to be in the same direction. A foreign probate, because of the lack of jurisdiction, is not entitled to "full faith and
credit" in the state where the realty is located. 7 The argument on
the other side is predicated on the nature of a probate decree.
That is, the statement that the governing law of wills of real property is the lex rei sitae properly refers only to requirements of
substantive law and not to matters of practice. In this view a
foreign decree of probate should be conclusive as to that which it
purports to determine, i. e., presence of testamentary capacity
and absence of undue influence.
In most states today, there are statutes regulating the effect
of foreign probate as regards both real and personal property. Such
statutes may be, for general purposes, divided into two classes:
those which abrogate the common law rule governing the disposition of real property, and those which simply provide that the ancillary probate shall be conclusive that such was in fact the testator's
will. The latter class, of which the West Virginia statute quoted at
the beginning of this note is an example, seems to constitute the
majority. There are similar enactments in New York,8 Rhode
Island,9 Georgia,' 0 and Ohio." Where there are such statutes it
is still necessary that the will conform in execution and other substantive requirements to the lex rei sitae, whether there is express
provision to such effect in the act or not.
Statutes of the formr class are comparatively rare. The Maryland statute12 provides that every will made outside of the state
shall be valid in Maryland (I) "if made according to the forms
required by the law of the place where the same was made," or
(2) "by the law of the place where the testator vas domiciled when
the same was made," or (3) "according to the forms required by
the law of this state." In a recent decision"3 under this act, it
was held that an unattested holographic will made in accordance
with the laws of a foreign country where the testator was residing
would pass realty in Maryland, although such will was not in the
form required by the law of the latter state. There are similar
7Robertson v. Pickrell, io9 U. S. 6o8 (1883).
Code Civ. Proc., § 2703.
9 Rhode Island Rev. Stat., Sect. 9,Chap. x55.
10 Georgia Civil Code, § 3298.
"1Act of May 3, 1852, § 52.
12Maryland, Code of 1904, § 327.
12 Lindsay v. Wilson, io3 Md. 252 (r9o6).
8 New York
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statutes in Massachusetts14 and Connecticut,15 but the tendency of
legislation and judicial interpretation seems to be in favor of the
common law rule which requires conformity with the law of the
situs.
S.A.
QUASI-CONTRACTS-WHAT

CONSTITUTES

UNJUST

ENRICH-

MENT-The term "unjust enrichment" is frequently used by the
courts and text writers in stating the basis of liability in quasicontract actions. Owing, perhaps, to the great variety of the cases
grouped under this general head, there is a certain amount of conflict and more or less confusion as to just. what is meant by enrichment. Sometimes the word is used in a manner to indicate
that an actual increase of the defendant's estate is requisite., Undoubtedly in many cases such an increase is essential to a right of
action. For instance, where improvements have been put upon.
land by a lessee, without the request of the lessor, the recovery,
if any, can be only for the enhanced value of the land,2 as that is
the only benefit which the lessor can be said to have received.
Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Company3 is a case in the Supreme
Court of Utah holding that the plaintiff may recover the reasonable
value of his services, although the net result of his employment was
a loss to the defendant. The Orchard Company hired Fabian to
make a market for its canned asparagus. With the consent of
the defendant a large quantity was sold, below the cost of production. Fabian, being unable to sue on the contract because it was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds, brought a quasi-contract
action. The Orchard Company defended that the action could
not be maintained as no enrichment was shown, but the court
took the view that Fabian should be allowed to recover the reasonand need not show that the Orchard
able value of his services,
4
Company had profited.
While this is not a universal view,? it is submitted that it is
a proper one, and represents the better considered cases. Since
the defendant has received the services bargained for, it would
be most unjust were the plaintiff denied a recovery of their value.
It is true an action upon a constructive or quasi-contract is based
upon the theory of restoring a benefit received by the defendant,
14 Massachusetts, Gen. Sts., Chap. 92, § 8; Slocomb v. Slocomb, 13 Allen
38 (Mass., x866).
liConn. Gen. Sts., Chap. 24, § 293; Irwins App., 33 Conn. 140 (1865).

584

IKeener, "Quasi-Contracts," pp. 278, 279; Gillis v. Cobbe, 177 Mass.
2
reer v. Vaughan, 96 Ark. 524 (191o); Adams v. Kells, 79 Kans. 564.

(19o9); Union Hall Ass'n v. Morrison, 39 Md. 281 (1873); Wendell v. Moulton,
26 N. H. 41 (1852).
• 125 Pac. Rep.

86o (Utah, 1912).
'Cozad v. Elam, 115 Mo. App. 136 (1905); Vojahn v. Bark, 144 WVis. 646
(1911); Werre v. N. WV. Thresher Co., 131 N. W. Rep. 721 (S. D., x91i).
$ Gillis v. Cobbe, supra; but note a strong dissent.
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and that the measure of damage is the value of the benefit to the
defendant. But it is not easy to see the force of the argument
that the plaintiff should be paid only when the defendant makes a
profit. That seems to be deducting the unmarketability of the
goods from the value of the services. While the original contract cannot be sued upoi, it is, nevertheless, good evidence that
the services in question were of value; and it was proper that that
value should be restored to the plaintiff.
The principal case is clearly distinguishable from a case where
labor and materials are used in constructing a machine, or building
a monument, in misreliance upon an unenforceable contract.'
When the defendant in such a case repudiates the contract, and
refuses to take the machine, or the monument he has received nothing that he can restore. So, too, where services are rendered toa third person on the request of the defendant, nothing has been
received by the defendant. 7
Fabian v. Wasatch Orchard Company finds support in an
analogous line of cases, where, under a contract, which for some.
reason is not enforceable, improvements are placed on the land of
the defendant. In these cases, he has. received a benefit in thesame sense that a benefit was received in the principal case, and
is generally held for the value of the labor and materials, whether
or not he has been enriched by an increase in the market value of
the property.$
J.C.D.
Dowling v. McKenney, 124 Mass. 478 (1877); Barker v. Henderson, 58.
N. Ji L. 26 (1895).
Bristol v. Sutton, xi5 Mich. 365 (1897).
8
White v. Wieland, io9 Mass. 291 (1872); Smith v. Smith, 28 N. J.L.
2o8 (x86o). "The plaintiff's right is to recover upon an implied contract topay for labor and materials used upon his property at his request
..
The right does not depend upon the ultimate benefit received by the owner."
Vickers v. Ritchie, 202 Mass. 247 (9o9), commenting upon Gillis v. Cobbe,
6

supra.

